Second National Action Plan to Prevent and Counter Radicalisation and Violent Extremism

2023 - 2027



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List of acronyms

CCDS	Conference of Cit	y Directors of Security
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CCJPD Conference of Cantonal Justice and Police Directors

CDSS Conference of Cantonal Directors of Social Services

DDPS Federal Department of Defence, Civil Protection and Sport

EDK Swiss Conference of Cantonal Ministers of Education

FDJP Federal Department of Justice and Police

fedpol Federal Office of Police

FIS Federal Intelligence Service

incel Involuntarily celibate (a person (usually a man) who regards himself or herself

as being involuntarily celibate)

IV Invalidity insurance

NAP National Action Plan to Prevent and Counter Radicalisation and Violent Extremism

PMT Federal Act on Police Measures to Combat Terrorism (PMCT)

RK MZF Intergovernmental Conference on Issues relating to Military, Civil Protection and Fire Services

SCP Swiss Crime Prevention

SEM State Secretariat for Migration

SPI Swiss Police Institute

SSN Swiss Security Network

1. Introduction

Violent right- and left-wing extremism and jihadist-motivated terrorism have posed a significant threat to Switzerland's security for several years.1 Against this backdrop of heightened terrorist threat, the Federal Council adopted the Counterterrorism Strategy for Switzerland in September 2015.² The Strategy defines four areas of activity: prevention, repression, protection and crisis preparedness. The first National Action Plan to Prevent and Counter Radicalisation and Violent Extremism (NAP), which was adopted by the Confederation and the cantons in 2017, made a significant contribution to the 'prevention' area of activity. The National Coordination Office, which is part of the Swiss Security Network (SSN), supported and regularly monitored the implementation of the first NAP. The SSN Political Platform³ commissioned an external evaluation at the end of 2021 that showed that individual measures had not yet been implemented sufficiently. 4 There are therefore still gaps and challenges in the area of prevention that need to be addressed: in particular, networking needs to be expanded and information sharing needs to be improved, particularly between authorities. Furthermore, regional differences in prevention need to be minimised. When implementing preventive measures, it is important to consider all forms of radicalisation and violent extremism and to address their various causes. The evaluators also identified considerable potential for improvement in the National Coordination Office, which should assume a strong supportive role in the aforementioned networking and in the preparation of information for specialists. The necessary resources should be made available accordingly.

The second NAP includes targeted measures to prevent various forms of radicalisation and violent extremism, and places a special focus on young people, as they can be particularly vulnerable and receptive to radical ideologies.5 The aim is to prevent radicalisation processes early on that could ultimately lead to the planning and commission of terrorist and other violent extremist acts. For prevention to be effective, interdisciplinary cooperation between authorities at communal, cantonal and federal levels as well as with international partners is key. Civil society should also be involved wherever possible when sharing corresponding information and lessons learned – the challenges associated with this topic are multifaced by nature and affect society as a whole. This second National Action Plan is in line with fundamental and human rights, and is consistent with the areas defined by the United Nations to effectively prevent and combat violent extremism.6

The second National Action Plan was developed by the SSN Office in cooperation with a core group set up by the SSN, on behalf of the SSN Political Platform. The core group comprised the relevant operational stakeholders from all three levels of government, and the scientific community. The strategic advisory group, which had originally been established to draft and implement the first National Action Plan, was also involved in the development of the second plan and defined its strategic focuses. This advisory group, which included representatives at the communal, cantonal and federal levels who offered strategic inputs, approved the second National Action Plan in autumn 2022.

Federal Intelligence Service (2022). Situation Report: Switzerland's Security 2022.

² Dispatch on Switzerland's strategy to combat terrorism of 18 September 2015, BBI 2015 7487 (in German, French, Italian).

The SSN Political Platform is the is the mandating body of the SSN Secretariat and consists of the heads of the Federal Department of Justice and Police (FDJP) and the Federal Department of Defence, Civil Protection and Sport (DDPS) as well as the presidents of the Conference of Cantonal Justice and Police Directors (CCJPD) and the Intergovernmental Conference on Issues relating to Military, Civil Protection and Fire Services (RK MZF).

The results of the external evaluation of the first National Action Plan to Prevent and Counter Radicalisation and Violent Extremism are summarised in the corresponding final report of 4 November 2021.

Manzoni et al. (2019). Einflussfaktoren extremistischer Einstellungen unter Jugendlichen in der Schweiz.

United Nations Organization (2015). Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism (A/70/674).

The political supervisory body, which was chaired by the head of the Federal Department of Justice and Police (FDJP) and included representatives from the CCJPD, CDSS, the Swiss Union of Cities and the Association of Swiss Communes, approved the second National Action Plan to Prevent and Counter Radicalisation and Violent Extremism at the end of 2022. The NAP was presented to the SSN's political platform and the Federal Council at the end of 2022. The measures

described in the NAP, which are to be understood as recommendations, will be implemented over the next five years. To be able to prevent and counter radicalisation and violent extremism, in addition to a shared understanding of the issue, more effective cooperation between public offices and civil society is needed. For this reason, the measures described in this National Action Plan must be implemented in an interdisciplinary and inter-institutional way.

2. Context

2.1 Situation in Switzerland

Violent extremism and terrorism are one of the main threats to Switzerland's security.7 In the area of violent extremism, violent left and right groups pose the greatest threat: in 2021, the FIS registered 202 incidents linked to violent left-wing extremism and 38 linked to violent right-wing extremism. Compared to 2020, the number of incidents by left-wing extremists remained stable at a high level, while the number of incidents carried out by right-wing extremists has increased. Also, increasing social division can lead to new forms of extremism: in 2021, for example, 35 incidents were recorded in connection with the coronavirus pandemic.8 In addition, two violent terrorist acts were carried out in Switzerland in 2020: a fatal stabbing in Morges in September and another stabbing in Lugano in November. In both cases, the perpetrator acted alone and was motivated by jihad.

In its most recent situation report from 2022, the Federal Intelligence Service states that individuals inspired by jihadist propaganda currently pose the greatest terrorist threat in Switzerland. These perpetrators are acting increasing autonomously - this makes early detection and prevention more difficult, as does the fact that perpetrators' violent Islamist-inspired motives are also more and more affected by mental health and other personal problems. Because of this, their motives may be difficult to determine. In the case of the Lugano stabbing, the perpetrator was diagnosed during her criminal trial in August 2022 with psychotic disorders. Nevertheless, the Islamist movement in Switzerland should not be underestimated. It also poses a threat in the long term, because its members/supporters could provide financial and logistical support for violent Islamist actors. In addition, members consume and disseminate jihadist content on the Internet, facilitating the emergence of sympathisers across state borders. People returning from jihad and current or former prisoners who have been radicalised may continue to support this violent ideology, and there exists a risk that they could re-join the Islamist scene. Ensuring they are kept from doing so and reintegrating these people into society is therefore a major challenge both for the authorities and for society as whole.

2.2 Radicalisation causes

There can be many reasons for a person to become radicalised; the causes listed below are not exhaustive. Essentially, they can be divided into two categories: push and pull factors. Push factors are environmental and include a lack of socio-economic opportunities, marginalisation and discrimination, prolonged and unresolved (social and state) conflicts and socially disadvantaged or radicalisation-favouring environments such as prisons, etc. Pull factors include an individual's personal background and motivations, psychological factors of collective discontent, a subjective feeling of oppression, subjugation or being under the control of others, belief systems that have become distorted or are being instrumentalised, radicalisation-favouring political ideologies or ethnic and cultural differences.

Manzoni et al. (2019)¹¹ confirm the influence of push and pull factors in their study on Extreme views among youths in Switzerland, in which they state that rightwing extremism is increased by political or societal discontent and is influenced by the individual's personality traits: right-wing extremist views will increase the more a person endorses authoritarianism and violence-legitimising norms of masculinity and rejects diversity in gender identities and sexual orientation. The consumption of right-wing extremist media and membership in right-wing extremist-oriented groups is also associated with stronger right-wing extremist attitudes. The same applies to supporters of Islamist extremism: the more frequently a young person consumes extreme Islamist media, the higher their approval of extreme Islamist views. In addition, these young people will also reject diversity in gender identities and sexual orientation, and speak out in favour of violence-legitimising norms of masculinity.

Factors influencing left-wing extremist views include young people's disillusionment with the political system and a feeling of not being represented in it. This may lead them to conclude that the system is under the control of certain powers, and they may gravitate to conspiracy theories. As with other groups of young people with extreme views, consuming far-left media

⁷ Federal Intelligence Service (2022). <u>Situation Report: Switzerland's Security 2022</u>.

⁸ Swiss Federal Council (2021). Die Sicherheitspolitik der Schweiz. BBl 2021, 2895 ff (in German, French, Italian).

⁹ United Nations Office of Counter-Terrorism (2018). Preventing Violent extremist Reference Guide. Radicalisation Awareness Network (2016). The Root Causes of Violent Extremism.

¹⁰ Simovic, L. et al (2021). Inklusion and Vielfalt in Jugendverbänden (teaching aid).

¹¹ ibid., p. 48-55.

and belonging to far-left groups strengthens their radical views. Connecting with teachers can have a preventive effect against developing extremists views because teachers may be able to stop the radicalisation process through dialogue, openness and attention. The second NAP includes prevention measures that are universal, selective and indexed to counteract these causes.

2.3 Institutional and legal/strategic framework to combat and prevent radicalisation and violent extremism in Switzerland

As safeguarding internal security is primarily the responsibility of the cantons¹², it follows that cantonal and communal authorities must be responsible for preventing radicalisation and violent extremism, within or outside the traditional security sector, in collaboration with civil society organisations. In some cantons and cities, for instance, competence centres or contact points take on this task. This National Action Plan contains targeted prevention measures and is therefore primarily aimed at these offices. In cases where the cantons' legal instruments and measures to detect criminal offences are insufficient, under the Federal Act on Police Measures to Combat Terrorism (PMCT) the cantons (or the FIS) can apply to the Federal Office of Police (fedpol) for preventive police measures to be imposed outside of criminal proceedings or after the completion of a sentence or measure. 13 If their suspicion is confirmed and the individual is involved in or supports a criminal or terrorist organisation, the Office of the Attorney General opens criminal proceedings and entrusts fedpol with carrying out investigations in cooperation with cantonal and city police forces. The cantons then provide administrative assistance and enforcement aid to the Confederation in areas where the Confederation has a constitutional duty or is otherwise legally required to ensure domestic security.14 If the person under suspicion is a minor, the cantonal office of the juvenile prosecutor (or juvenile court) is responsible. In case of a conviction, the authorities responsible for enforcing sentences and measures are charged with applying reintegration and resocialisation measures. After the person's release from prison, different offices (i.e. security and social services) are involved if the person remains radicalised and aims to use violence to achieve goals that go against state order.

The legal bases and competences for preventing and combating radicalisation, violent extremism and terrorism listed here are not exhaustive. They are presented within the framework of the implementation of Measure 10, 'Identification and intervention processes', as well as in the postulate on the analysis of 16 December 2021 on 'Combating terrorism and extremism', which was ratified by the Federal Council in February 2022. This analysis deals in particular with the definition of responsibilities and competences of the FIS, the security bodies and the criminal justice authorities.¹⁵

¹² Constitution of the Swiss Confederation of 18 April 1999 (status 13 February 2022).

fedpol (2022). Stages of radicalisation.

¹⁴ Art. 4 para. 2 Internal Security Act (ISA) of 21 March 1997

^{15 21.4598} Postulate on the analysis on combating terrorism and extremism (in German, French and Italian)

3. Definition of terms

The selection of terms was made based on the current threat situation. This list is not exhaustive.

3.1 Terrorist activities

Attempts to influence or change the framework of the state that are realised or encouraged by committing or threatening to commit serious offences or by spreading fear and alarm.¹⁶

3.2 Radicalisation

Radicalisation is a process whereby a person aspires to increasingly extreme political, social or religious aims and in some cases will even use violence to achieve these aims.

3.3 Violent extremist activities

Efforts by organisations that reject democratic and constitutional values and which commit, incite or endorse acts of violence in order to achieve their objectives.¹⁷

3.4 Different forms of extremism

3.4.1 Right-wing extremism

Right-wing extremism is a political orientation that opposes the principles of democracy and the rule of law, and rejects social diversity. Right-wing extremists typically form groups and sub-groups, which are based on individual followers. Right-wing extremism is based on intolerance and prejudice, e.g. against foreigners and minorities, promotes authoritarianism and glorifies power and violence.¹⁸

3.4.2 Left-wing extremism

Left-wing extremism is a political orientation that opposes how the state and society are organised today. It demands absolute equality, and places this above the principle of freedom. A critical view of capitalist society and its power structures lies at the core of left-wing extremism. Main areas include anti-capitalism, egalitarianism, anti-fascism and internationalism.¹⁹

3.4.3 Single-issue extremism

Single-issue extremism includes various political orientations that reject certain aspects of democracy and the rule of law when it comes to one or several specific issues. Single-issue extremism includes groups that aim to change society or that reject state measures but do not use the tools available to them in a democracy to achieve these goals.

3.4.4 Islamist extremism

Islamism, or Islamist extremism, is an ideology and socio-political movement that refers to problematic scripture and strands of Islam that have a potential for violence. Persons who identify as Islamists support a model of socio-political organisation that does not limit Islam to a spiritual faith and ritual practices but instead considers it a comprehensive system of norms and practices according to which Muslims must live their lives, both in private and in public. Islamism is heterogenous in its teachings (i.e. different understandings of Sharia law and its application) and in what tools are to be applied to achieve the utopia of an Islamic society. These tools include the religious mission, political activism or the use of force. Violent Islamism is called jihadism.

¹⁶ Art. 19 para. 2 let. a of the Federal Act on the Intelligence Service

¹⁷ Art. 19 para. 2 let. e of the Federal Act on the Intelligence Service

¹⁸ See: Astrid Bötticher, Miroslav Mareš (2012): Extremismus. Theorien – Konzepte – Formen, p. 297.

¹⁹ See: Astrid Bötticher, Miroslav Mareš (2012): Extremismus. Theorien – Konzepte – Formen, p. 351ff.

3.4.5 Ethno-nationalist extremism

Ethno-nationalism is a strand of nationalism whose demands for self-determination are based on a group's assumed ethnic unity. In the second half of the 20th century, many self-described ethno-nationalist groups were motivated by a desire to achieve national unification or to fight against occupation or suppression by a government they perceive as foreign. They may share a political agenda with other ideologies such as Marxism or Islamism.

3.5 Disengagement

Disengagement is the process by which individuals cease to support or be mobilised in support of a violent extremist movement.

3.6 Reintegration

Reintegration refers to the reestablishment of social, familial and community ties and positive participation in society.

4. Principles

The following three principles are fundamental to the measures contained in the second NAP. They are inherently transversal and therefore should be applied across all measures. As stated in the introduction, prevention is a task for society as a whole. In order to promote diversity in our society, behavioural and structural prevention²⁰ are necessary to counteract discrimination, radicalisation and extremism. **Cooperation between authorities** as well as **between authorities and civil society** is extremely important to prevent and combat radicalisation and violent extremism; it is the first of the three principles presented here.

The second principle focuses on **promoting critical thinking**: digital communication platforms and services play an important role in the radicalisation of young people. Extremist actors are aware of this fact and will use these channels to disseminate propaganda and to network across state borders. The spread of content is difficult to control on the internet. Developing critical thinking skills and strategies to evaluate media content helps identify and prevent threats early on. Promoting these skills will, of course, be useful in the analyses of all sources of information independent of where they are published.

While radicalisation processes affect men and women alike, they do not affect them equally often or in the same way. When analysing dynamics of radicalisation, gender must therefore be factored in and connections drawn to gender-specific socialisation processes. Violent extremist men and women also have different motives and take on different roles; this was demonstrated by the 'Islamic State' terrorist organisation in 2018.21 There has also been an increase in incel forums in Europe.²² An incel is a man who is involuntarily celibate and believes he is unable to maintain sexual or romantic relationships with women in the long term. Incels mainly congregate online, both on large social media sites such as Facebook, and websites that are less well regulated. Some of these forums have already been blocked for being potentially dangerous. The third principle correlates with the second principle above: in order to recognise any form of radicalisation and violent extremism, we must be able to critically assess media content. In the US and Canada, incels have carried out several public attacks against women. For these reasons, the third principle states that the **different needs and requirements** of men and women must be considered, and that prevention and reintegration must be based on analyses and approaches that take gender into account.

4.1 Inter-institutional and interdisciplinary cooperation and coordination

Effective collaboration between security and other authorities at all levels of government must be ensured, formalised and developed further. Cooperation should also include institutions in civil society and, were needed, the science community. The National Coordination Office helps facilitate coordination and promote knowledge sharing, including the transfer of best practices. The Coordination Office has access to external knowledge²³ and is able to share knowledge gained internationally with cantonal and communal authorities. Furthermore, the Coordination Office acts as a liaison, for example to find experts who can help with intervention and integration measures.

4.2 Media literacy and promoting critical thinking

Strengthening people's ability to analyse and think critically, and promoting a culture of debate is key when dealing with electronic media and social networks. We also need to further develop and expand our ability to develop and actively disseminate counter- and/or alternative narratives both on and off the internet since extremist groups instrumentalise fake news, social media channels and other websites, chat functions, etc. in a targeted way to recruit, radicalise and mobilise new members.

²⁰ Structural prevention means changing living conditions to positively affect a person's health. Behavioural prevention places a focus on a person's individual health-related behaviour. By strengthening their personality, providing information and raising awareness, a person can be motivated to behave in healthy ways and avoid risks. (Fonds Gesundes Österreich (2022))

²¹ Casutt, G. (2018). Quand le djihadiste est une femme.

²² Radicalisation Awareness Network (2021). <u>The Incel Phenomenon: Exploring Internal and External Issues Around Involuntary Celibates.</u>

²³ The role of the Expert Panel is explained in Chapter 6.2.

4.3 Gender sensitivity and mainstreaming

The effectiveness of radicalisation prevention can be increased through gender-sensitive analyses and measures. This means that analyses should not only describe gender differences but also allow us to gain an understanding for how radicalisation dynamics are connected with gender socialisation processes and cultural gender norms. When implementing each measure contained in this National Action Plan, we must ensure we reach our intended target group and that we consider gender-specific concerns and requirements within this target group according to UN Resolution 1325 on women, peace and security²⁴, which Switzerland has ratified.

5. Measures of the four fields of action

The prevention measures to prevent and combat radicalisation and violent extremism can be divided into the following four fields of action. They comprise a total of eleven measures. These measures were designed

based on conclusions drawn following the implementation of the first National Action Plan, but also take the changing environment into consideration.






Figure 1: Principles and fields of action of the NAP to prevent radicalisation

5.1 Identifying and reducing radicalisation causes

The development and use of tools to promote critical thinking skills in schools and in vocational training programmes should be encouraged.
 These tools should be geared towards identifying and categorising fake news, extremist narratives and conspiracy theories. Existing tools can also be developed further or brought up to date and used.

Political responsibility: EDK

Operational responsibility: Specialist offices, National Coordination Office and cantonal departments of education

 Actors outside the field of education should work with children, adolescents and young adults, as well as with leaders of (youth) associations, to promote skills needed for critical thinking and to identify fake news.

Political responsibility: CDSS

Operational responsibility: CDSS, religious communities, cultural centres, youth associations and organisations (Swiss National Youth Council, SNYC)

5.2 Awareness raising and knowledge building

3. Research projects and studies on radicalisation and violent extremism will be launched in Switzerland. Funding can be secured independently by the researchers' institutions; the Confederation may co-fund certain research projects and studies in key areas. These scientific projects will take gender-specific differences into account.

Political responsibility: Confederation and cantons Operational responsibility: Education and research institutions (self-initiative, execution), authorities (tenders) 4. Continuing to offer existing and creating new further training options for the target groups listed below will continuously raise awareness and teach people how to recognise when someone has been radicalised, how to interact with radicalised people, and what options are available (e.g. who to contact).

Existing training options will be continued and new ones developed in particular for the following target audiences (list not exhaustive):

- Teachers (at compulsory education level, in vocational schools and of bridge-year courses)
- Social workers (including those working in schools)
- (School) psychologists and psychiatrists
- Youth workers
- Juvenile court judges
- Youth prosecutors
- Security authorities
- Prison officers
- Probation officers
- Supervisors of people receiving invalidity pensions or social assistance
- Supervisors of apprentices
- Parents' associations (including competence centres and contact points that provide information for parents and other caregivers)
- Supervisors of asylum seekers (staff in private companies that perform tasks on behalf of the state)
- Migration authorities
- Religious counsellors, chaplains
- Coaches and staff of sports associations
 (e.g. football clubs and martial arts schools)
- Volunteer leaders in youth associations
- People working with sports fans

Political responsibility: EDK, CDSS, CCJPD, FDJP (SEM, fedpol)

Operational responsibility: Educational institutions, institutions cooperating with other institutions or organisations that deal with radicalisation, trade associations, the Expert Panel²⁵, police forces, relevant authorities at all levels of government and other public and private organisations

5.3 Information and threat management and networking

- 5. Further development of threat management
 - 5.1 Interdisciplinary threat management will be introduced or consolidated, developed further and expanded to strengthen prevention efforts as well as efforts to reintegrate radicalised people.²⁶

Political responsibility: CCJPD, CCDS Operational responsibility: Cantonal and communal police corps, Conference of Cantonal Police Commanders (CCPCS), SCP, SPI in cooperation with civil society partners

5.2 The rapid and targeted exchange of personal data between the authorities at all levels of government will be regulated by law.

Political responsibility: Confederation and cantons
Operational responsibility: Federal and cantonal authorities

Long-term financing of existing competence centres and contact points, some of which may be temporary, will be secured (through the revision of existing regulations and/or long-term service agreements).

Political responsibility: CCJPD, EDK, CCDS Operational responsibility: Cantonal and communal authorities 7. Cantons, communes or regions that do not yet have their own will establish a competence centre or contact point, or conclude service agreements with an existing provider to benefit from synergies. This will ensure the supply of services throughout Switzerland.

Political responsibility: CCJPD, EDK, CDSS, CCDS Operational responsibility: Cantonal and communal authorities

- 8. Consolidation and development of the competence centres and contact points
 - 8.1 In many cases, competence centres and contact points were originally established in an ad hoc way or out of urgent necessity. In order to be able to consolidate and develop them further, framework conditions and quality criteria will be defined.

Political responsibility: CCJPD, EDK, CDSS, CCDS

Operational responsibility: National Coordination Office in cooperation with competence centres and contact points

8.2 Competence centres and contact points will orient themselves by these framework conditions and quality criteria when defining their organisational structures and when processing cases.

Political responsibility: CCJPD, EDK, CDSS, CCDS

Operational responsibility: Competence centres and contact points

 Competence centres, contact points, the Confederation, cantons and cities will regularly host exchanges and create opportunities to share knowledge.

Political responsibility: Confederation, cantons, communes, cities

Operational responsibility: National Coordination

Office, federal, cantonal and communal authori-

ties, competence centres and contact points

5.4 Interventions in the case of at-risk and radicalised persons

Measures to identify and intervene in radicalisation processes as well as to support disengagement and reintegration will be developed and implemented based on the reference list included in the first NAP.²⁷

10. Models showing the identification and intervention processes for the disengagement and reintegration of at-risk and radicalised persons will be made. Following the principle of interdisciplinary cooperation, these models will include areas of cooperation between authorities and the familial, social and professional environment of the at-risk or radicalised persons.

These models will provide a visual representation of the offices responsible for voluntary reintegration measures, and will also be used by authorities as a guideline to support the families of at-risk or radicalised persons. The external evaluation carried out at the end of 2021 showed that the reason these efforts have not yet been implemented is a lack of resources and undefined responsibilities.²⁸

Political responsibility: Confederation, cantons, communes, cities

Operational responsibility: National Coordination Office in cooperation with authorities at all levels of government and partners in civil society

11. The cantons, communes and cities will define steps to implement the processes defined in Measure 10.

Political responsibility: Cantons, communes, cities

Operational responsibility: The authorities responsible will implement the processes defined in Measure 10. The National Coordination Office will provide support wherever needed and may provide information on best practices or refer specialists.

²⁸ See the <u>final report</u> of the Evaluation of the National Action Plan to Prevent and Counter Radicalisation and Violent Extremism of 4 November 2021, page 32 (in German and French).

6. Implementation and resources

Preventing and countering radicalisation and violent extremism is a task for the state and for society as a whole. It requires long-term commitment. The National Action Plan includes a selection of targeted prevention measures that will be implemented according to defined responsibilities; offices responsible will provide the necessary resources.

The Confederation may financially support new or existing projects carried out by the cantons, communes, cities or civil society to implement the measures defined in the NAP. Art. 386 of the Swiss Criminal Code and the corresponding Ordinance Against Radicalisation and Extremism of spring 2023 provide the legal basis.

6.1 National Coordination Office

The implementation of the NAP will be monitored by the National Coordination Office, the strategic advisory group and a political supervisory body. The National Coordination Office will regularly report on the progress made to the strategic advisory group and political supervisory body. This will help ensure that the responsibilities of the state actors are respected. The National Coordination Office also provides other services; these are described in Chapter 4.1.

6.2 Expert Panel

The Expert Panel supports the National Coordination Office and the authorities at all levels of government in the implementation of the second NAP. The panel's exact tasks and responsibilities, and how its mandates/ services will be financed, are still to be defined.

7. Monitoring and evaluation

Regular monitoring will provide an up-to-date overview of the implementation of measures. Within the five-year implementation phase, an external evaluation will be commissioned to monitor implementation and the effectiveness of the measures. This evaluation as well as the monitoring reports will be appropriately coordinated.

8. Annex

Additional references:

- Swiss Security Network (2017). <u>First National Action Plan to Prevent and Counter Radicalisation and Violent Extremism</u>, 2018–2022.
- Swiss Security Network (2020). <u>Reference list of measures to support disengagement and reintegration</u>.
- The monitoring reports on the first NAP show which measures have been implemented and where there is still a need for action:
 - Swiss Security Network (2019). <u>2018 Monitoring Report</u> (in German and French)
 - Swiss Security Network (2021). <u>2019–2020 Monitoring Report</u> (in German and French)
- The Confederation offers an incentive programme to support measures taken by cantons, communes, cities and civil society to implement the National Action Plan through projects and programmes that have the aim of preventing and countering radicalisation and violent extremism in all its forms. The <u>projects</u>, which are co-financed by the Federal Office of Police, are available online, in German, Italian and French.
- The first NAP included the requirement that it would be evaluated externally within five years in order to
 monitor the implementation and effectiveness of its measures. This evaluation was carried out at the end
 of 2021; the final report (Executive Summary) is available online.

As part of the implementation of the second NAP, progress will be monitored regularly, primarily through input and output measurements. An external evalu-

been radicalised, how to interact with radicalised

people, and what options are available (e.g. who

to contact).

ation will be carried out to determine the overall impact. The monitoring indicators are listed below.

grammes, categorised by target audience and

type of programme (output)

with providers

Measure	Implementation monitoring indicators (input and output levels)
Identifying and reducing radicalisation causes	
Measure 1: The development and use of tools to promote critical thinking skills in schools and in vocational training programmes should be encouraged. These tools should be geared towards identifying and categorising fake news, extremist narratives and conspiracy theories. Existing tools can also be developed further or brought up to date and used.	 Number of existing and new tools/materials that deal specifically with promoting critical thinking in the context of extremism (input) Use of tools/materials (depending on their publication form)
Measure 2: Actors outside the field of education should work with children, adolescents and young adults, as well as with leaders of (youth) associations, to promote skills needed for critical thinking and to identify fake news.	 Number of specific projects/events categorised by region and group of actors (input)
Awareness raising and knowledge building	
Measure 3: Research projects and studies on radicalisation and violent extremism will be launched in Switzerland. Funding can be secured independently by the researchers' institutions; the Confederation may co-fund certain research projects and studies in key areas. These scientific projects will take gender-specific differences into account.	 Number of new publications thematically related to the NAP and Switzerland, categorised by topic. Number of research projects funded by the Confederation within the framework of the NAP, categorised by topic
Measure 4: Continuing to offer existing and create new further training options for the target groups listed below will continuously raise awareness and teach people how to recognise when someone has been radicalised, how to interact with radicalised.	 Number of existing/new continuing education programmes, categorised by target audience (input) Number of participants in these training pro-

Information and threat management networking

Measure 5: Further development of threat management

- **Measure 5.1:** Interdisciplinary threat management will be introduced or consolidated, developed further and expanded to strengthen prevention efforts as well as efforts to reintegrate radicalised people.
- Number of cantons that have subjected their threat management to a (systematic) review and adapted it where necessary
- **Measure 5.2:** The rapid and targeted exchange of personal data between the authorities at all levels of government will be regulated by law.
- Number of cantons that have the necessary legal basis to share personal data
- Number of cantons that are in the process of establishing/implementing such a legal basis

Measure 6: Long-term financing of existing competence centres and contact points, some of which may be temporary, will be secured (through the revision of existing regulations and/or long-term service agreements).

 Number/percentage of competence centres whose existence is de facto secured in the long term

Measure 7: Cantons, communes or regions that do not yet have their own will establish a competence centre or contact point, or conclude service agreements with an existing provider to benefit from synergies. This will ensure the supply of services throughout Switzerland.

- Number of cantons offering adequate services (directly or through another canton)
- Number of cantons that have concluded service agreements

Measure 8: Consolidation and development of the competence centres and contact points

Measure 8.1: Consolidation and development of framework conditions and quality criteria

 Definition of new framework conditions/quality standards (yes/no)

Measure 8.2: Competence centres orient themselves by the framework conditions and quality criteria.

 Number/percentage of competence centres that have established framework conditions/quality standards

Measure 9: Competence centres, contact points, the Confederation, cantons and cities will regularly host exchanges and create opportunities to share knowledge.

- Number of meetings and exchanges (by type, e.g. spanning several groups of actors, interdisciplinary)
- Number of joint projects between cantons or cities

Interventions in the case of at risk and radicalised persons

Measure 10: Models showing the identification and intervention processes for the disengagement and reintegration of at-risk and radicalised persons will be made.

 Visual representations of processes to identify and intervene (yes/no)

Measure 11: The cantons, communes and cities will define steps to implement the processes defined in Measure 10.

 Number of cantons, communes and cities that have adapted or introduced processes

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